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Between Consensus, Consolidation
and Crisis: Immigration and
Integration in 1970s Britain
Entre consensus, consolidation et crise: immigration et intégration en Grande-
Bretagne dans les années 1970
Vincent Latour
1 The 1970s have often been considered in relation to other decades. Andy Beckett, though
not necessarily sharing that perception himself, calls the “turbulent” 1970s “a hangover
from  the  1960s”,  whereas  others  consider  them  as  a  decade  of  downright  decline,
dominated by the notion of crisis, the final decade of the post-war consensus which was
shattered by Margaret Thatcher and the New Right in the 1980s. However, the 1970s were
also  characterised  by  a  number  of  experiments,  failures  but  also  sometimes
achievements, which contributed to shaping late 20th and early 21st century Britain. It is
the aim of  this  article  to establish and document to what  extent  this  applies  to the
questions of immigration and integration. 
2 Alongside the omnipresent and multifaceted notion of “crisis”, the weight of the post-war
consensus was clearly felt throughout much of the decade, although various forces were
already at work to undermine it. 
3 Part one will show that the immigration legislation put in place in the 1970s reflected to a
very large extent the state of public opinion since the 1960s at least and was the result of
a broad cross-party consensus on the need to control immigration, despite the existence
of critical, divisive episodes, such as the Ugandan refugee crisis. 
4 Part two will  turn to state intervention regarding integration and racism. As will  be
documented, on the one hand the 1970s saw the consolidation and the extension of the
Race Relations legislation framework devised in the mid-1960s and on the other hand, the
persistence of ordinary racial prejudice and the rise of violent racism.
5 Part three, finally, will turn to migrant groups, politics and crises. It will investigate and
document the attitude of the main two parties towards immigrants, as well as the specific
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forms of immigrant mobilisation - whether particularist or not - that took shape in the
1970s, both inside and outside mainstream political parties and unions. 
 
Immigration: consensus and crisis
A Broad Consensus on Immigration Control
6 In June 1970, when Edward Heath took over as Prime Minister, Britain had already put an
end  to  mass  economic  immigration  from  the  New  Commonwealth,  not  because  the
country did not need migrant workers, but because their presence had aroused anxiety
and resentment among vast swathes of the British population for the past two decades.
However,  this  had  meant  neither  the  end  of  immigration,  nor  the  end  of  the
explosiveness of the issue. Indeed, the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, passed under
Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government, signalled the beginning of a new phase of
immigration, namely family reunification, which changed Britain’s ethnic, cultural and
religious profile far more than economic immigration in the fourteen years between 1948
and  1962.  Until  1962,  New  Commonwealth  immigrants  had  chiefly  been  men,
comparatively  few of  whom settled  firmly  in  the  UK.  Fears  of  impending  tightened
immigration controls meant that family reunion gathered momentum in the one and a
half  decades that followed the 1962 Act,  all  the more so as family reunion had been
guaranteed by the European Social Charter since 1961 (through Article 19, notably).1 
7 Throughout the 1960s and much of the 1970s, thousands of Indian, Pakistani or Jamaican
men were therefore joined by their wives, children (and not infrequently in the case of
Asians, other dependants). As a result, the numbers of New Commonwealth immigrants
rose sharply. In 1971, there were for example 313,00 Indians (as against 157,000 in 1961);
171,000 Jamaicans (as against roughly 100,000 in 1961);  136,000 Pakistanis and 58,000
Kenyans (neither Pakistan nor Kenya were part of the top ten non-UK countries of birth
in 1961). It is to be noted that Irish immigration remained remarkably stable throughout
the period (676,000 in 1971, as against 683,000 in 1961).2 
8 Even before assuming office in June 1970, Edward Heath had acquired a reputation as a
moderate  on  immigration  and  what  was  then  known  as  “race  relations”,  which  was
consistent with his “one nation” profile,  one nation Conservatism being the dominant
vision within the Tory party until Margaret Thatcher took over as leader in 1975. That
reputation had been shaped by the firmness he had displayed as Conservative leader
towards Enoch Powell when the then Shadow Home Secretary delivered his inflammatory
“Rivers of Blood Speech” in 19683, an episode evoked in retrospect by a somewhat self-
satisfied Heath in his memoirs, published in 1998:
It what against that volatile background that as Prime Minister I set about trying to
improve the situation […] Between 1968 and 1970, my mailbag had contained many
letters,  largely  from Conservative  supporters,  in  support  of  Enoch Powell.  They
were frequently abusive, towards me as much as towards black people, but this only
made me more resolute. There were certainly those in the party, even on the front
bench,  who wanted to harness racist  support.  Some commentators have argued
that I bowed to this pressure and that, as a result, Powell helped me to win the
election of 1970 just as he helped Wilson to defeat me in 1974 on the question of
Europe. I totally disagree.4
9 During the 1970 general election campaign, despite Heath’s moderate, centrist approach5,
Conservatives  had  pledged  that  there  would  “be  no  further  large-scale  permanent
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immigration”6.  This led to the introduction of the 1971 Immigration Act, which, again,
specifically  targeted  non-white  immigration,  by  establishing  a  distinction between  “
patrials” (those born in the UK or one of its remaining colonies or with a parent or a
grandparent born in the UK, i.e. Canadians, New Zealanders or Australians, for example)
and non-patrials. “Patrials” alone had the unconditional right to settle in the UK, while
non-patrials (e.g. Pakistanis, Indians, Jamaicans) had to apply for work permits, granted
only to those whose skills were in short supply in Britain. Non-patrials were, moreover,
subject to the non-renewal of their permit.7 According to Dominic Sandbrook, that piece
of legislation was meant to “bring up the drawbridge”, an objective that did not so much
reflect the personal views of most members of the government as it was meant to soothe
public opinion, as immigration remained the biggest potential election loser, seven years
after the Smethwick by-election8 and three years after Powell’s infamous speech:
[…]  Reginald  Maulding  told  his  colleagues  that  since  assimilation  was  “all  but
impossible” for Asians, immigration ought to be limited to people ‘from a cultural
background fairly  akin to our own’.  But  Heath’s  ministers were by and large,  a
liberal-minded lot,  and certainly more tolerant than the rest  of  the population.
They  closed  the  door  to  mass  immigration  not  because  they  were  racist
reactionaries, but because public opinion – as manifested in one poll after another -
demanded it.9 
10 Almost three decades later, Heath presented the 1971 Immigration Act as a moderate
piece of legislation and rejected the idea that it might be considered racist:
It is true that we promised to limit immigration in our manifesto, but we did so as
part of the balanced approach to the problem […] I could not have made clearer to
voters that there would be no Faustian pact with Powell and that racism would get
no encouragement of any kind from the Conservative Party, so long as I was its
leader.10 
 
The Ugandan Asian refugee crisis and the Tory Right
11 In August 1972 Heath’s reputed moderation was put to the test by a major crisis: the
expulsion of thousands of so-called “East African Asians”11 from Uganda, as a result of the
implementation of Africanization policies in the former British colony. Dictator Idi Amin
gave them one month to leave.12 As Heath wrote in his memoirs: “Uganda was still part of
the Commonwealth and we therefore had a moral  duty to accept these unfortunate people.”13
28,000  of  the  country’s  57,000  Asians  settled  in  Britain  in  total,  after  a  Uganda
Resettlement Board (URB) was set up, as announced by Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-
Home in a TV broadcast on 31 August 1972. The aim of the URB was to designate a certain
number of Local Authorities (usually those with comparatively few New Commonwealth
immigrants)  that would then be advised by the central  government in order to help
Ugandan Asians settle in the country. Again, Heath had to face to opposition from Tory
right-wingers. “This was led by Enoch Powell, and some sections of the media joined in the ugly
chorus”14,  Heath  writes  in  his  memoirs.  In  the  following  weeks,  the  Monday  Club15
launched a “Halt Immigration Now” campaign, which culminated at the Conservative Party
Conference in October 1972, Powell arguing that Britain had no moral obligations towards
Ugandan Asians and that therefore they should not be accepted. Powell and his like were
nevertheless defeated, thanks to the support of the Federation of Conservative Students
and to the young Conservatives.16
12 However,  the  1971  Act  contained  one  provision,  voluntary  repatriation  (section  29),
which  did  seem to  be  a  concession  to  Tory  right-wingers,  as  repatriation  had  been
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advocated  three  years  before  by  Enoch  Powell  in  his  notorious  speech.  The  1970
Conservative  manifesto,  however,  rejected  altogether  compulsory  repatriation,  which
Powell and the Monday Club repeatedly advocated before the general election. Powell,
who used the term “re-immigration” in his 1968 speech, went so far as to recommend the
creation of a “Ministry of repatriation” in the early 1970s17. The Monday Club deemed that
the  scope  of  repatriation  scheme  set  up  by  the  government  was  insufficient:  “  […]
Repatriation provisions seem to be limited to their  expenses of return. Unless that can include
resettlement, the response may not be as large as it should be.”18 Voluntary repatriation did
seem to be a token aspect of the 1971 Act, as admitted in 1973 by Robert Carr, the then
Home Secretary (1972-1974): 
I  still  think  that  assistance  with  repatriation  is  an  important  service  to  make
available to those who wish to go back. (...) I accept that the pressure created by it is
quite small in relation to other social and economic pressures, which at any given
moment tend to cause major flows inwards and outwards.19
13 It actually is very difficult to obtain reliable data about the number of immigrants that
actually used the scheme, but it does seem that its impact was minimal. In her PhD thesis,
Catherine Puzzo thus writes that 62 families only benefited from the scheme between
1971 and 1973 (i.e. a total of 216 people)20, to be contrasted with the 60,000 guest workers
plus  34,000  dependants  (60  per  cent  of  whom  were  from  Spain  and  Portugal)  who
benefited from a similar scheme in France between 1977 and 198.21
14 The present author tried to obtain information from the Home Office and significantly
enough got the following reply:
Your request has been handled as a request for information under the Freedom of
Information Act 2000 […] I have consulted the areas of the department which would
be most likely to hold the information you have requested, however my enquiries
have come back negative. Therefore I have concluded that the Home Office does not
hold the information which falls within scope of your request […].22
15 On the whole, Labour and Liberal opposition to the 1971 Immigration Act was minimal (as
underlined  by  Heath  in  his  memoirs23)  thus  illustrating  a  consensus  between  the
Conservative (1970-1974) and Labour (1974-1979) governments on the need to restrict
both primary and secondary immigration. Kenneth O. Morgan notes that James Callaghan
was “unsentimental” about restricting immigration, an issue “to be handled in a way attuned
to public opinion rather than on the basis of an abstract liberal political theory.”24 
16 The  next  point  will  discuss  whether  a  tacit  consensus  existed  on  the  question  of
integration too. 
 
Integration, racism and state intervention
17 Given  the  nature  of  post-war  immigration,  the  correlated  issue  was  “race”.  In  his
memoirs, Heath does not dodge the hostility displayed by the majority population, which,
in a typically British manner, he attributes to large-scale immigration:
When I  came to  power,  race  was  already  a  major  source  of  conflict  in  Britain.
Labour’s 1948 British Nationality Act had granted British citizenship to all people in
Commonwealth  countries  past  and  present  and  it  was  this  that  facilitated
immigration in the 1950s. The racial prejudice that these immigrants encountered
culminated in the Notting Hill race riots of 1958. Continuing inter-racial friction
eventually prompted Rab Butler to bring in the Commonwealth Immigration Act in
1962 to limit the numbers of non-white immigrants by means of an employment
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voucher scheme. Although discriminatory in practice, the principle behind it was to
give white  Britons time to  adjust  to  new arrivals  and,  thereby,  to  give existing
immigrants and their descendants more of a chance to integrate.25
 
The consolidation of Race Relations Legislation
18 By 1970, the intervention of the State was already visible in the field of integration. For
five years, the country had been endowed with a liberal, modern-day integration policy,
thus defined by Roy Jenkins, the then Labour Home Secretary in 1966: 
Integration is perhaps a rather a loose word and I do not regard it as meaning the
loss, by immigrants, of their own natural characteristics and culture. I do not think
we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will turn everyone out in a common
mould,  as  one  of  a  series  of  carbon  copies  of  someone’s  misplaced  vision  of  a
stereotyped  Englishman  […]  I  define  integration,  therefore,  not  as  a  flattening
process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with equality of opportunity,
in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.26
19 Although Jenkins’  definition was  rather vague,  it  clearly  distinguished integration in
Britain  from  both  American  and  French-style  assimilation  and  it  welcomed  the
expression  of  cultural  differences.  That  liberal  interpretation  of  integration  was
accompanied  by  the  completion  of  the  race  relations  legislation  that  the  Wilson
governments had started framing in the mid and late 1960s (1965 and 1968 Race Relations
Acts).
20 Edward Heath did not question the approach devised by his predecessor. In the debate to
the Queen’s speech on 2 July 1970, Heath pledged to ensure:
[…] justice to all those who are already in the country, whatever their race, creed or
colour may be, to set the public mind at rest on this issue so that there cannot be
any further justification for existing passions and so that they can be absolutely no
reason for apprehension on the part of immigrants who are already settled here.27
21 The Conservative government however did not go so far as to strengthen the existing
race relations legislation, despite its disappointingly poor record. Indeed, out of the 2,967
complaints investigated by the Race Relations Board (a watchdog set up under the 1965
Race  Relations  Act)  between 1965  and 1972,  seven only  resulted  in  court  cases:  five
verdicts were reached, two were lost, thus resulting in a conviction rate of 0.1 per cent.28
22 Imagined under Harold Wilson’s government, the third Race Relations Act was passed in
1976, under James Callaghan, who took over as Labour Prime Minister (1976-1979) after
Wilson resigned, for health reasons29, it emerged later. The 1976 Race Relations Act was
passed a few months after  the publication of  a  white paper on racial  discrimination
(September 1975),  which came to the conclusion that urgent but realistic  action was
required  and that  both  the  central  government  and local  authorities  should  set  the
example:
14.  The review of  race relations undertaken in the past  year has convinced the
Government that if urgent action is necessary, it is even more necessary to devise
policies  which  are  coherent  rather  than  spectacular,  to  set  targets  which  are
relevant and realisable rather than dramatic. The gravity of the prospect demands
action, but it places a premium on carefully considered action, consistently carried
through. Nothing at this juncture could be worse than bold promises without the
means of implementation. 
15. The Government has a special responsibility as an employer. An unequivocal
statement  of  the  Government’s  equal  opportunity  policy  has  been  made  to  all
Departments covering all grades and positions in both the industrial and the non-
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industrial  Civil  Service.  The  policy  states,  with  the  full  support  of  staff
representatives,  that there will  be no discrimination against  any person eligible
under the nationality rules whether in recruitment, training or promotion or in any
other way, on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins.30 
23 The 1976 Act introduced a new notion, indirect discrimination (i.e. a treatment which
may be described as equal in a formal sense may be discriminatory in its effect on one
particular racial group) and made provisions for positive discrimination: local authorities
were encouraged to “to  make  appropriate  arrangements” (a)  “to  eliminate  unlawful  racial
discrimination” and (b) “to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons
of different racial groups”.31 New Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants, who
formed the bulk of Britain’s non-white population, were now theoretically placed under
the full protection of law, which was long overdue. Indeed, it appears that in the 1970s
Britain, Asian or Afro-Caribbean immigrants were still  characterised, by and large, by
social  relegation,  or  indeed,  invisibility.  As  explained in 1999 by Jack Howard-Drake,
Assistant Secretary at the Home Office under Wilson’s and Heath’s Premierships, New
Commonwealth immigrants were employable provided they were not in touch with the
public, a situation that prevailed in many private sector firms until the mid 1970s, at
least: 
[…] [employers] were quite happy to employ coloured people but providing they
were not visible. In other words, if they worked in the kitchens, that was alright,
but employers felt that shoppers wouldn’t like to see coloured hands handling food
over  the  counter.  They  thought  that  ladies  wouldn’t  be  happy  to  buy  their
underwear from coloured girls.32
24 In addition, the 1976 Race Relations Act created a new body, the Commission for Racial
Equality (CRE), which replaced the old Race Relations Board. Although the scope of the
Act was in theory far greater than that of the previous two ones and tackled for the first
time the issue of racial segregation, it was criticised on the ground of its comparative
inefficiency. In Andy Beckett’s study, Ambavalaner Sivanandan, a leading figure at the
Institute of Race Relations (a think-tank created in 1958) is quoted saying: “The 1976 Race
Relations Act had no teeth. Never mind no teeth, it had no gums.”33 By the end of 1978, only
twenty-nine cases of racial discrimination had been investigated by the CRE, with merely
one  concluded,34 a  record  reminiscent  of  that  of  the  previous  watchdog,  the  Race
Relations Board. 
 
The persistence of “ordinary” racial prejudice and the rise of violent
racism
25 Racial prejudice remained widespread. This was especially true in the judicial system, two
decades  before  the  notion  of  “institutional  racism”  was  documented  by  the  Stephen
Lawrence inquiry.35 In 1970,  there were only 10 non-white policemen in London. The
campaign launched by Robert Mark (Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police from 1972
to 1977) to recruit black recruits in the Met failed to improve the situation, with 70 non-
white officers in 1976 (out of a workforce of 22,000),36 the year of the Notting Hill Carnival
riots,37 which took the shape of serious street clashes, thus prefiguring the inner city riots
of the 1980s. 
26 The  other  components  of  the  judicial  system  were  also  overwhelmingly  white  and
testified to the existence of a clear racial bias. This was obvious in courts and prisons. In
1978, John Kinglsey Read, a one-time member of the Conservative Party who then joined
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the  National  Front,  was  tried  at  the  Old  Bailey  for  incitement  to  racial  hatred  for
declaring, after the murder of a Sikh man in Southall: “One down, a million to go”. Judge
Neil MacKinnon ruled that it undeniably was an insult to a dead man but that it did not
constitute an insult in itself. MacKinnon multiplied controversial statements throughout
the trial, suggesting for example that “nigger” was not a term of abuse or that “the black
man wanted to follow the white man to Britain” [because of] the affection engendered” by the
British imperial legacy.38 Kingsley Read was acquitted by the all-white jury. Following the
trial, Turner writes, twenty non-white barristers refused to work with Judge McKinnon,
while 133 MPs signed a motion for him to be fired, despite the strict tradition of the
separation of powers.39 It should be underlined however that the although Kingsley Read
trial  had taken place two years after the passing of the 1976 Race Relations Act,  the
verdict  came just  a few days before the new Act came into force,  which means that
Kingsley Read was actually tried under the 1965 and 1968 Acts. In addition, Turner writes
that racial prejudice was at its worst in jails, with many prison officers sympathetic to the
National Front, including chaplains, as was the case, notoriously, at Brixton prison.40
27 Outside the judicial system, racial tensions were on the rise, with 36 racially motivated
murders between 1976 and 1981, the majority of which took place in East London and the
Midlands.  The  rise  of  violent  racism and the  comparative  electoral  successes  of  the
National  Front  (until  1979)  prompted  the  creation  of  the  Anti-Nazi  League  (ANL),
launched in 1976 following a press conference held in the House of Commons under the
aegis of Labour MP Neil Kinnock. The driving force behind, however, was the Socialist
Workers’ Party, whose influence could also be felt in Rock Against Racism, a series of
accompanying concerts involving punk, reggae or new wave bands.41 
28 However the general picture of race relations in 1970s Britain was not so grim. Racial
tensions existed in other countries too, in France notably, where North Africans were the
primary targets of brutal racist attacks. Thus, between March and July 1971 alone, eight
Algerians were killed, in Lyons, mostly. Tensions were particularly obvious in Marseilles
too, where seven North Africans were killed in August 1973. Later that year, in the tense
context  of  the  Yom  Kippur  War,  a  bomb  attack  targeted  the  Algerian  consulate  in
Marseilles,  killing  four people,  which  prompted  President  Pompidou  to  declare  that
France was “a deeply antiracist country”. 
29 Moreover, the anti-discriminatory legislation that existed in the 1970s was well ahead of
its time and made Britain a truly unique country in Europe. By contrast, a comparatively
low-key  law had  been  passed  in  July  1972  in  France to  outlaw incitement  to  racial
discrimination, hatred and violence, as well as to prevent the expression of racist ideas in
the press.  For all  its  merits,  it  did not match in any way the scope of  Britain’s  race
relations legislation.42 
30 The pro-active  British  approach of  the  1970s  paved the  way for  the  multiculturalist
policies of the 1980s and 1990s. Although Britain factually was “multicultural” by the 1970s
(in  the  descriptive  acceptation  of  the  term),  the  terms  “multicultural”  and  “
multiculturalism” were unheard of in 1970s Britain. It was not until the turn of the 1980s
that they started emerging, mostly in activist and academic circles at first, despite what is
sometimes suggested.43
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Migrant Groups, Politics and Crises
Mainstream Political Parties and immigrants
31 After Margaret Thatcher took over as Conservative leader, the Conservative Party moved
away from its one nation approach. This applied to immigration and race relations too:
the Tories’ anti-immigration and assimilationist stances became increasingly clear. This
was of course reinforced by Margaret Thatcher’s rhetoric of invasion, deployed during a
TV interview for World In Action (Granada, 1978):
[…] Let us try and start with a few figures as far as we know them, and I am the first
to admit it is not easy to get clear figures from the Home Office about immigration,
but there was a committee which looked at it and said that if we went on as we are
then by the end of  the century there would be four million people  of  the new
Commonwealth or Pakistan here. Now, that is an awful lot and I think it means that
people  are  really  rather  afraid  that  this  country  might  be  rather  swamped  by
people with a different culture and, you know, the British character has done so
much for democracy, for law and done so much throughout the world that if there
is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile
to those coming in.44
32 Unsurprisingly,  the  appeal  of  the  Conservative  Party  among  New  Commonwealth
immigrants  was  at  best  very  limited,  although John Solomos  does  underline  that  in
certain constituencies there were attempts at wooing the Asian electorate, whose views
on free enterprise, family or religious values seemed to converge with Thatcher’s. The
Labour Party was still perceived as the immigrants’ natural party, notably owing to its
decisive role in framing race relations legislation. In the 1974 and 1979 general elections,
the vast majority of New Commonwealth immigrants voted Labour. The Labour Party
Race Action Group was a pressure group created in 1975 within Labour. Its aim was to “
raise awareness of the politics of racism within the party”, as underlined by John Solomos.45 It
was  a  comparatively  successful  attempt  and  prepared  the  ground  for  the  radical
measures put in place in the early and mid-1980s in Labour-run councils (e.g. contract
compliances) or indeed the controversial black sections.
 
Specific immigrant mobilisation inside and outside mainstream
Political Parties
33 John Solomos argues that in the 1970s, pretty much like in the 1960s, there appeared in
Britain “a variety of different forms of autonomous organisation in a number of different contexts
rather  than  unified  ethnic  movements”.46 As  a  matter  of  fact,  what  few  nation-wide
movements  did  emerge  rarely  stretched  beyond  the  limits  of  strictly  defined
communities.  The situation of  British Sikhs is  a case in point.  Despite their previous
involvement in various bus disputes throughout the country with Afro-Caribbeans and
other  immigrants  from  the  Indian  subcontinent  (notably  in  Bristol  in  1963),  Sikhs
continued, on the whole, to pursue a particularist agenda, after the successes of the first
turban campaign of the 1960s. In the 1970s this resulted in the second turban campaign,
which went on for three years (1973-1976).  Sikhs opposed a new law, which made it
compulsory, as from 1 June 1973, for motorcyclists to wear crash helmets (Section 32 of
the Road Traffic Act 1972). The Act’s implication was that Sikh motorcyclists would be
required to remove their turbans. Like the previous and the following campaigns, it was
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chiefly managed by the Gudwara networks throughout the country. At the 1974 general
election, a Sikh man unsuccessfully stood as a single-issue candidate in Ealing. Harold
Wilson’s Labour Government eventually granted Sikhs an exemption (Motor-Cycle Crash
Helmets [Religious exemption] Act 1976). Later in 1978, under Callaghan, the third turban
campaign began: the Mandla case,  which was to end in 1983 with a ground-breaking
House of Lords decision, recognising Sikhs both an ethnic and a religious group. Despite
their  narrow  focus,  Gurharpam  Singh  and  Darsham  Singh  Tatla  argue  that  these
campaigns  had  a  broader,  national  impact,  as  they  put  the  recently  created  anti-
discriminatory legislation to the test and as such, contributed to shaping what was to
become British multiculturalism.47 
34 Although Muslim cultural and religious demands were to be formulated on a large scale
in the 1980s with the rise of political Islam, notably following the publication of Rushdie’s
Satanic Verses (1988), some particularist grievances started emerging in the 1970s. In 1977,
the Union of Muslim Organizations wrote to the Home Secretary to ask that halal food be
served in schools and canteens with significant numbers of Muslims. Other grievances
included for example provisions for prayer time or prayer rooms and the incorporation of
elements of the Islamic law for the country’s Muslims (around one million then).48
35 Sporadically,  however,  there  emerged  local  movements  that  rallied  a  wide  range  of
supporters.  One case in point was the Grunwick dispute (1976-1978).  Grunwick was a
North West London photo-developing business, one of the largest in Britain, with roughly
500 employees. Certain departments, such as the mail order department, were almost
exclusively  staffed by Asian women,  mostly  from Kenya and Uganda.49 The company
would not recognise the right of its employees to be represented by unions and only
made  provisions  for  a  “works  committee”,  set  up  in  1975.50 The  question  of  the
representation of  workers  was all the more problematic  as  the workload intensified.
Compulsory  overtime  was  imposed  on  workers  and  working  conditions  deteriorated
during the summer of 1976, one of the hottest in the 20th century. Tensions and incidents
between the mostly Asian employees and the management multiplied, with the firing of
several employees. On Monday 23 August 1976, Jayaben Desai, an East African Asian, and
five of her colleagues mounted a picket and collected signatures for a petition. By mid-
afternoon,  about  fifty  Grunwick workers  had joined the picket  line.  In the following
weeks and months, the dispute intensified, with clashes between some employees or their
left-wing supporters (members of the Communist Party or the Socialist Workers’ Party,
notably) and the Metropolitan police.
36 The dispute received extensive coverage from the national media, which spoke about the
“strikers in saris”, while Grunwick strikers got support letters from China or the US. On 30
June 1977, the Callaghan government – three members of which, Shirley Williams, Denis
Howell  and  Fred  Mulley  had  briefly  joined  the  picket  line  one  month  earlier  –
commissioned the Scarman Inquiry. Public hearings took place during the summer and at
the end of August Lord Scarman disclosed his conclusions: unions should be recognised
and  the  employees  that  had  been  fired  should  be  re-instated.51 Nevertheless,  the
employer, supported  by  Thatchers’  Conservatives  and  groups  like  the  National
Association For Freedom (a libertarian, law and order association launched in December
1975 by right-wing Tories, such as writer and television presenter Norris McWhirter and
Viscount de l’Isle52, a former Governor General of Australia) rejected the advice. The TUC
threw in the towel and the workers’ strike committee announced the end of the dispute
in June 1978. 
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37 Technically,  Grunwick may have been a failure but it  was the first  dispute involving
chiefly  non-white  protagonists  that  received  widespread  support  from  the  labour




38 As this article has endeavoured to show, the 1970s saw the gradual weakening of the post-
war consensus, amidst a series of various crises, whether political, societal or cultural. 
39 In the field of immigration, the sense of continuity with the 1960s dominates. Indeed, the
restrictive policies put in place by the Conservatives in the first half of the 1970s were by
and large consistent with those put in place by Labour in 1965 and 1968 and later between
1974 and 1979, although some Labour MPs were vocal in denouncing the double standards
of the 1971 Act53, which in theory enabled millions of old Commonwealth immigrants to
settle in the UK. 
40 Regarding integration, despite its comparative failure, the pro-active British approach of
the 1970s endeavoured to respond to racial  discrimination,  both in employment and
housing and paved the way for the equal opportunity policies of the 1980s and 1990s. The
1976  Race  Relations  Act  was  a  unique  piece  of  legislation  in  Europe  when  it  was
introduced. It was well-ahead of its time and provided a framework for fighting racial
discrimination and fostering equal opportunity for the next three and half decades, until
it was superseded by the 2010 Equality Act. 
41 Finally,  the  visible  acceleration  of  migrant  community  mobilisation  in  the  1970s,
announced the greater visibility and coordination (though not necessarily the greater
success) of ethnic minority mobilisation in the 1980s (e.g. Afro-Caribbean cultural and
economic demands during the urban riots of the Thatcher era; the rise of Muslim cultural
demands),  in  the context  of  the  shift towards  multiculturalist  policies  in  the United
Kingdom.
42 Therefore, the perception of the 1970s as, essentially, a decade of transition and decline
can and should be challenged, at least when it comes to immigration and integration.
43 Vincent  Latour  est  Professeur  des  Universités  en  civilisation  britannique  à
l’Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès et membre de l’équipe CAS (EA 801). Ses travaux
(monographie,  articles,  chapitres,  ouvrages  collectifs),  souvent  comparatistes,
portent  sur  les  politiques  d'immigration  et  d'intégration  au  Royaume-Uni,  en
France et en Europe. 
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ABSTRACTS
The vision of the 1970s tends to be dominated by the notions of crisis and decline. However the
1970s  were  also  characterised  by  a  number  of  experiments,  sometimes  failures  but  also
sometimes successes, which contributed to shaping late 20th and early 21st century Britain. It is
the aim of this article to establish and document to what extent this applies to immigration and
integration.
La vision dominante des années 1970 au Royaume-Uni est celle d’un pays en crise et en déclin.
Néanmoins,  cette  décennie  fut  également  marquée  par  nombre  d’expérimentations,  d’échecs
mais aussi parfois de succès, qui ont contribué à façonner la société britannique de la fin du
20ème et le début du 21ème siècles. Cet article entend démontrer et illustrer dans quelle mesure
ce constat s’applique également aux questions de l’immigration et de l’intégration. 
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